by unelected people. 4 This private legislation-most often class action settlement-affects thousands and, in some instances, hundreds of thousands of citizens. 5 Second, a new descriptive paradigm is needed to capture both the essence and the nuance of the complex litigation that the American judicial system has experienced at the end of the twentieth century.
Scholars who posit models or describe paradigm shifts chiefly are engaged in the enterprise of re-evaluation of facts. 6 That is, new descriptive models emerge from a fresh appreciation of facts, replacing former orthodoxy. 7 This is certainly what Professor Chayes did in describing the emergence of the public law model. Professor Chayes viewed the litigation landscape of the 1960s that gave rise to the modern class action rule, structural injunctions and institutional reform litigation. He assimilated these facts and reconstructed prior litigation theory that had been based on a model of bipolar litigation s While it is difficult enough to describe a model of complex litigation at the end of the twentieth century, it is perhaps even more challenging to forecast the future of complex dispute resolution. History has taught that adjective law-civil procedure-is not static. 9 In particular, complex litigation has pushed the boundaries of civil rules that were designed for simple litigation. Therefore, the globalization of social and economic transactions in the twenty-first century will affect complex litigation, and the procedures for resolving complex disputes will be informed by legal lessons from abroad.
Regarding complex dispute resolution, the future of complexity is more complexity. Complex systems tend to become more complex. Moreover, procedural rules develop in a dialectic. Thus, systems tend to start with simple rules, but over time rules tend to become longer, more 4. See id. (describing that in new era of aggregate private dispute resolution, private parties and judicial surrogates wield vast power to resolve aggregate claims).
5. See id. at 440 (describing minimal role clients play in litigation although consequences of any settlement may affect up to hundreds of thousands of people).
6. See THOMAS S. KUHN , THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIc REvOLUTIONs 7 (2d ed. 1970) (stating that new theory reflects upon studies and work already successfully completed).
7. See id. ("A new theory, however special its range of application, is seldom or never just an increment to what is already known. Its assimilation requires the reconstruction of prior theory and the reevaluation of prior fact, an intrinsically revolutionary process .... ).
8. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge, supra note 1, at 1282 (noting that traditional civil litigation is bipolar because " [I] itigation is organized as a contest between two individuals or at least two unitary interests, diametrically opposed, to be decided on a winner-takes-all basis").
9. See Mullenix, supra note 3, at 419 (describing 1966 revision of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
nuanced, textured and complex. 10 In the past twenty'years, almost every rule revision has yielded a lengthier and more convoluted rule, as the drafters have attempted to provide solutions for every problem and contingency.
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Part of this dialectic is that the impulse towards complexity inevitably leads to reform and simplification. At some point, when the rules have become so complex, intricate and obtuse-creating traps for the unwary1 2 -reformers avow to eliminate the rules and start again, with simple rules. This dialectic impelled the great procedural reforms of the nineteenth century' 3 that famously resulted in the creation of "one civil action" 14 and, in one simple declaration, swept away centuries of procedural cobwebs with the abolition of the forms of action. 15 At the end of the twentieth century, it is difficult to perceive where the civil rules are in the context of this dialectic. Have the civil rules become sufficiently complex that, in the twenty-first century, the rulemakers will embark on another age of procedural reform? Will the rulemakers again feel the need to declare, anew, that there will be one form of action, and it will be a simple action? Or, in this dialectic, will the rulemakers abandon the grand experiment with trans-substantive rules and revert back to substance-based procedure? 16 History also has demonstrated that the judicial system lacks the forecasting powers to anticipate new problems. Attorneys, judges and rulemakers simply cannot know what kinds of problems, disputes or grievances will emerge to challenge the role of the judiciary. Jurists, then, typi-10. For example, the current version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is considerably longer than the original 1938 Rules.
11 12. See FLEMINGJAMES, JR., ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.6 (4th ed. 1992) ("Too often, mistakes of form led to loss of a suit by the party entitled to win on the merits.").
13. See id. § 1.7 (noting procedural reforms in United States and England). 14. Id. § 1.8; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action."').
15. SeeJAMEs, supra note 12, § 1.8 (describing enacting of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a) ("No other pleading shall be allowed .... "); FED. R. Civ. P. 7(c) ("Demurrers, pleas, and exceptions for insufficiency of a pleading shall not be used.").
cally engage in rule reform after-the-fact, to deal with problems that the rulemakers never anticipated.
In our generation, for example, the most famous illustration of the judicial system's failure to anticipate new problems is the rule drafters' failure in the early 1960s to anticipate modern mass tort litigation. Thus, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules revised the federal class action rule without knowing what was coming. If the Advisory Committee could not forecast mass torts, what problems will emerge in the next millennium that are not currently foreseeable? There are other examples, of course; but whom at mid-century could have anticipated agent orange, the Dalkon Shield, breast implants, fen-phen or tobacco litigation?
Moreover, in reflecting on the future of complex litigation, it is impossible to ignore the impact of technology and globalization. Technology effectively has enabled international transactions to transcend national borders, and will affect the way in which lawyers conduct their professional activities. Globalization means that business, social and legal transactions will also transcend national borders.
In the twenty-first century, the impact of technology and globalization will result in legal problems of global reach, and lawyers will be practicing on a world stage. Therefore, the American lawyer will need to understand comparative law and how American legal concepts constitute a kind of "outlier" among legal systems. This is especially true regarding the ways in which other legal systems resolve complex legal disputes.
The globalization of legal practice will have other consequences. As complex legal problems transcend national borders, American procedural law may well converge with the adjective law of civil law systems. The pronounced differences between Anglo-American procedure and civil law countries may fade or merge as each system learns from the experiences of the other. The interaction of American lawyers and scholars with civil law colleagues may well spur a convergence of procedural law.
II. CrL LAW SYSTEMS: DESCRIBING THE DIFFERENCES
The process of teaching comparative procedure in American law schools is basically an exercise in teaching the differences between American procedure and civil law systems. 17 In the United States, the "American Rule" provides that each side of the litigation pays its own litigation costs, expenses and attorney fees (with some statutory fee-shifting exceptions). 24 Contingency fee contracts are permissible (and usual) in certain types of litigation-most prominently personal injury and other tort litigation. 25 Also, plaintiffs' attorneys are permitted to front the costs of contingent litigation. 26 In contrast, civil law countries follow the "loser pays" rule, prohibit contingency fee contracts, and do not permit attorneys to front the costs of litigation. 37 Within this system, the role of the judge is conceived as that of the neutral arbiter, tasked with the narrow role of determining issues of law.
3 8 The judge is not a fact-finder.
3 9 There is no professionalized judiciary and no specialized training for judges (prior to appointment or election to the bench).
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In civil law countries, the model of the inquisitorial judge is almost the opposite. The civil law judge is the fact-finder, an active participant in legal proceedings and the ruler on issues of law. 41 In civil law countries, the judiciary is highly professionalized and judicial aspirants elect a course of study in preparation to serve as a judge after the award of academic degrees.
42

* EVIDENTARY STANDARDS AND ALLOCATION OF BURDENS OF PROOF.
In the United States, trial procedure and the admissibility of evidence are governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, which circumscribe the ability to adduce proofs.
4 3 In addition, the plaintiff carries the burden of production and proof. 44 Most civil law countries, however, do not recognize or apply evidentiary rules as stringently as the United States, and civil law courts often allow various forms of evidence and testimony. 45 In addition, in various civil claims, many civil law countries shift the allocation of burdens of production and proof to the defendant. In the United States, issue and claim preclusion is governed by an elaborate body of decisional law that operates to prevent relitigation of claims and issues that could have, or should have, been asserted in a prior proceeding against parties and their privies.
5 1 In contrast, most civil law countries do not recognize the doctrine of resjudicata, or the "binding effect" of prior legal decisions. 5 2 9 LEGAL EDUCATION. In the United States, legal education is a separate post-graduate course of study and separate academic degree. In civil law countries, legal education is part of an integrated undergraduate course of study, with specialized training for a professionalized judiciary and other legal functions. 48. See Parker, supra note 47, at 272 (noting that scope of Congress' authority to modify standing to sue is unresolved).
49. See id. at 299 n.138 (reviewing scholarship and case law on issue of Congress' ability to confer standing to sue in civil litigation).
50. See Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 24, at 269-70 (discussing civil law concepts of standing); CAPPELLETTI & GARTH, supra note 36, at 137-39 (same); Koch, supra note 36, at 77 (discussing standing for associational groups in German law); K6tz, supra note 24, at 104-06 (discussing associational standing in France); Parker, supra note 47, at 262, 272-98 (discussing standing to sue in Italian system); Taruffo, supra note 33, at 176-78, 188-89 (same). The study of law in continental Europe is quite unlike our pragmatic, .problem solving" focus; it is dominated by dogmatics, i.e., a focus on legal abstractions and the inter-relationship of juridical concepts. In the 56 In civil law countries, the opinions of legal scholars provide the most authoritative source for determining the law.
5 7 Civil law countries generally do not recognize the doctrines of stare decisis, 58 binding precedent and res judicata.
5 9
e ANNEXATION OF CIVIL CLAIMS TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. In the United States, criminal, civil and administrative law proceedings are separate. Each proceeding entails a different burden of production and proof. 60 In many civil law countries, it is possible to "annex" a civil claim to a criminal proceeding and to seek civil remedies in the context of a criminal proceeding. 61 The combined criminal-civil proceedings enable a civil claimant to use the resources of the prosecutor's office to pursue civil relief.
62
* LEGAL CULTURE. In the United States, at least according to critics, a culture of grievance and "litigiousness" encourages citizens to resolve any classroom, the European professor plunges into the comprehensive codes and meticulously extracts every possible meaning, nuance, and cross-reference out of every word and phrase. He likewise endlessly massages concepts when he creates dottrina through his scholarship. This approach moves directly with the Continental lawyer into offices and courtrooms and legislatures, for as Professor Merryman accurately says, "In civil law jurisdictions, the way legal scholars look at the law is the way everyone looks at it." Id. 391, 394-95 n.9 (1993) (noting that "most civil law countries do not have a rule against splitting a claim").
See generally
60. SeeJAMEs, supra note 12, § 7.14 (discussing different measures of persuasion in civil and criminal proceedings).
61. See Fisch, supra note 24, at 53-54 (1979) (noting overlap of private and penal law claims in Europe); Howlett, supra note 19, at 252, 262-63, 267 (stating that German legal system permits civil claims to be joined with criminal complaints and tried at one time); K6tz, supra note 24, at 104-05 (describing ability to annex civil claims to criminal proceedings in France); Taruffo, supra note 33, at 184-86 (describing ability to annex civil claims to criminal proceedings in Italy).
62. See Howlett, supra note 19, at 262-63 (noting role of prosecutor's office).
and every complaint through litigation. 63 In civil law countries, by contrast, no such culture of litigiousness exists, and is indeed alien to societal norms.
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This list, of course, is not complete. It does not include, for example, generalizations about the vast differences in social and political systems that also have an effect on legal culture. 65 It does not describe differences in legal structures or institutions. But this survey does provide a sense of how the legal academy thinks about and teaches comparative civil procedure, an exercise in difference that is profoundly pervasive and entrenched.
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It is worth noting that American students and the American practicing bar typically recoil from this civil law jurisprudence. Many U.S. legal commentators have urged broad adoption of aspects of the inquisitorial system. Perhaps these commentators are heartened by the shift taking place in modem mass tort litigation. Perhaps courtappointed experts, settlement class actions with intense judicial oversight, and other inquisitorial approaches are exactly what mass torts need. Perhaps these developments are something of a culmination of the twentyyear trend of managerial judging in the United States.
More likely, however, they are destined for failure, or at least incompleteness, because U.S. judges are ill-equipped for effective inquisitorial judging. Even as we urge judges to use the inquisitorial tools that can help achieve just and efficient resolutions to mass torts, we should note realistically the barriers that stand in the way. As a matter ofjudicial culture, training and structure, the U.S. judiciary may be poorly positioned to take on substantial inquisitorial responsibilities. Id. at 2010-11. Professor Erichson then supports his conclusion with a litany of the comparative differences between American jurisprudence and civil law systems that serve as barriers to resolving mass torts, as would our civil law colleagues. See id. at 2011-15 (suggesting that adversary system in United States is barrier to inquisitorial justice).
67. This is so notwithstanding the best efforts of American law professors to encourage (if not command) their American students not to make normative comparative assessments of the American and civil law systems.
actions, does not permit contingency fees, American-style discovery, jury trials or the possible recovery of punitive damages. 68 
III. COMPLEX LITIGATION AND CONVERGENCE
Comparative civil procedure then, as a matter of practice and theory, remains a problem in difference. In the next millennium, however, as a consequence of the globalization of complex legal disputes, the differences in American and civil law procedure may well converge in interesting ways. It may turn out that the litany of comparative differences that comparative scholars enumerate does not consist of as great a chasm as they suggest.
Moreover, the convergence of American procedural law with civil adjective law has already begun in many aspects of complex civil litigation. For example, this convergence is nascent, if not already evident, in at least five areas: (1) the role of the judiciary; (2) the right to trial by jury; (3) punitive damages; (4) discovery; and (5) 
A. Convergence: The Role of the Judiciary
Perhaps the best example of the convergence in the resolution of complex litigation concerns the role of the judiciary. In the standard academic repertoire addressing the American judicial function, the scholarly literature is replete with analysis concerning the differences between the American judge and the civil law "inquisitorial" judge. 73 But, particularly in the realm of complex litigation, the American managerial judge has undertaken roles that are indeed converging with the civil law inquisitorial judge. 74 In many respects, then, it is difficult to differentiate between the American judge and his or her civil law counterpart as they deal with complex cases. My distinguished colleague Professor Walter, University of Bern Institute for Swiss and International Civil Procedure, has rightly objected to the American usage of the term "inquisitorial" judge to describe the role and function of judicial officers in civil law systems. Professor Gerhard suggests that this American appellation summons pejorative connotations of the Spanish Inquisition, with civil law judges extracting information through use of the rack and screw. See id. at 471 (stating that many commentators do not think common-law and civil systems could be merged).
74. See JAMES, supra note 12, § 1.2 ("The principle of party-prosecution has been modified in modern judicial administration by the proposition that the court has an affirmative responsibility to move a case along to settlement or trial.").
Although our judges still are not fact-finders, it is difficult not to take note of the increasing managerial involvement of judges in the resolution of complex cases, often verging on functions such as fact-finding. Much complex litigation, therefore, will take the judge and counsel into sparsely charted terrain with little guidance on how to respond to pressing needs for management. Practices and principles that served in the past may not be adequate, their adaptation may be difficult and controversial, and novel and innovative ways may have to be found. While this manual should be helpful within the limits of its mission, it should be viewed as open ended, and judges are encouraged to be innovative and creative to meet the needs of their cases, though remaining mindful of the bounds of existing law. Rather than describing the passive, neutral judicial function, the Manual begins with a highly expansive view ofjudicial control and supervision of complex cases. 80 The Manual informs judges that multiple federal rules authorize substantial judicial case management and reminds judges that they also have extensive inherent powers to control the complex litigation in their courts. Perhaps the Manual's most telling description of the activist judge is contained in the section that describes the attributes of effective case management. Here, the Manual states that " [e]ffective judicial management generally has the following characteristics":
The judge attempts to anticipate problems before they arise rather than waiting passively for matters to be presented by counsel. Because the attorneys may become immersed in the details of the case, innovation and creativity in formulating a litigation plan may frequently depend on the court.
o IT is SUBSTANTIVE. The judge's involvement is not limited to procedural matters. Rather, the judge becomes familiar at an early stage with the substantive issues in order to make informed rulings on issue definition and narrowing, and on related matters, such as scheduling, bifurcation and consolidation, and discovery control. The Manual continues with additional attributes of effective judicial management, indicating that the judge's supervision should be timely, continuing, firm, fair and carefully prepared. 84 These attributes, moreover, embody several of the core values incorporated into the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act ("CJRA") 8 5 that Congress enacted as a mandatory reform program on all ninety-four federal district courts. The convergence of the judicial function with investigative fact-finding in complex litigation has been most evident in the expansive use of court-appointed expert witnesses and special masters. Judges have employed these 'Judicial surrogates" to engage in fact-finding, frame legal conclusions or administer remedies. 95 Most prominently, judges have used special masters to collect and synthesize data about class claimants for the purpose of assessing damages awards. 96 For example, Judge Jack Weinstein in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York employed a special master in asbestos class litigation to determine the factual question whether the defendant's financial assets constituted a limited fund for the purposes of class certification.
9 7 The special master held evidentiary hearings and concluded with a finding of a limited fund.
9 8 In the context of class action litigation, the proof of a limited fund normally is committed to the parties. 9 9 In this instance, however, Judge Weinstein authorized independent fact-finding apart from any evidentiary presentation by the parties. In addition to these examples, the federal judge supervising the litigation against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos employed a special master to collect data on individual claims for the purposes of creating a damage extrapolation model. 10 3 This special master spent months in the Philippines collecting fact information and reporting to the court. Judges have also employed special masters to propose trial plans, or judges have themselves created trial plans for complex cases. Thus, in Texas, Judge Robert Parker authorized a special master to propose a multi-stage trial plan for classwide resolution of asbestos claims, including resolution of classwide aggregate damages.
10 8 Over the objections of both the plaintiff and defense counsel, Judge Parker issued a trial plan substantially based on the special masters' proposed plan, including the masters' legal justifications in support of the plan. In addition to the use of court-appointed experts, science panels and special masters, judges in complex litigation have used judge magistrates to take an activist, hands-on approach to resolving complex litigation.
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For example, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Judge Parker created and approved an alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") plan for resolving asbestos claims, 1 12 which was essentially administered by a magistrate judge delegated with the task of implementing the ADR plan. 113 Finally, another attribute of the judicial function that has been modified in complex litigation concerns the extent to which judges flexibly administer evidentiary rules. For example, most federal judges do not apply strict evidentiary rules to class certification hearings, and generally allow any and all evidence in support of, or in opposition to, a proposed class certification.' 1 4 Similarly, judges recognize rather loose evidentiary rules at class settlement hearings, again permitting virtually all testimony into the record. 115 Moreover, it is not uncommon for judges involved in class certifications or settlement hearings to actively question witnesses providing testimony or to elicit testimony from objectors.'
This increased use of and reliance on judicial surrogates in complex litigation has reconfigured the role and function of the federal judge, and the looser judicial attitude towards evidentiary rules in some settings is striking. In modern complex litigation, then, the central role of adversariness has been diminished to the extent that judges no longer rely solely on the parties to frame legal issues, present facts or evaluate legal conclusions. Moreover, activist judges in complex litigation are perfectly willing to override the attorney's role in controlling and conducting the litigation, Thus, the traditional model in which the party-adversaries frame the issues, present the facts and control the conduct of the case has been substantially modified by the judge's ability and willingness to engage independently in these activities. In many respects (that are not completely captured by the preceding description), the American federal judge presiding over complex litigation now often acts like his or her civil law counterpart.
B. Convergence: The Right To a Jury Trial
Although the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury, a right that litigating attorneys hold sacrosanct, almost all complex cases typically are resolved without recourse to a jury trial. Virtually no mass tort case, for example, has been tried to a jury. 1 1 7 Indeed, the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury is a waivable right, if the lawyers neglect to invoke it.
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Complex cases are settled, of course, in the "shadow" of the threat of a jury trial. But most practicing class action attorneys recognize that, in reality, the case in which they are involved will not be tried to a jury. Moreover, there is substantial academic literature that has urged the basic reform that lay juries should be eliminated in complex litigation, 1 9 and that blue-ribbon juries or science panels be used instead to evaluate the complex legal and evidentiary issues in these cases. 118. SeeJAMEs, supra note 12, § 8.1 (discussing right to trial by jury). Notwithstanding that certain types of class actions are never actually tried to a jury, the contemporary class certification process now requires class proponents to engage in the interesting exercise of hypothesizing a mythological jury trial that everyone understands will never occur. At class certification, the plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating that the proposed class action satisfies all the requirements for class certification.
12 1 In Rule 23(b) (3) actions, the plaintiff additionally must show that the proposed class action is a superior means for resolving the dispute, which in turn requires a showing that the proposed class action will be "manageable." 1 2 2
In order to show manageability, many courts now require that the class proponents present a trial plan demonstrating how the class action will be tried.
12 3 The proposed trial plan typically will include suggestions for multi-phase trial stages,' 24 choice-of-law considerations 1 25 and proposed jury instructions. 126 The failure of the plaintiffs to explain to the court, in some detail, how the proposed action actually will be tried may serve to defeat the manageability factor. 127 The presentation of such complex trial plans, however, carries an air of fabrication and conjuring.
In turn, defendants or objectors in complex cases often invoke the Seventh Amendment to challenge novel and innovative trial plans.
12 8 Despite the hypothetical nature of these trials, courts have been willing to repudiate class certification based on the theoretical design of a trial that This exercise in future trial planning (or retrospective settlement hindsight) is largely an exercise in literary imagination because a high percentage of class litigation is never tried to ajury. This is also true for complex litigation resolved through the Multidistrict Litigation Statute.
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The lack of actual jury trials in complex litigation, then, renders the debate over the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial a largely academic exercise in the United States.
C. Convergence: Punitive Damages
Civil law countries do not have punitive damages. 133 For American tort lawyers, the thought of a legal system without punitive damages is anathema. But in fact, many complex cases are settled without punitive damages at all. Although punitive damages may still play an important role in traditional bipolar litigation-and the newspapers are filled with reports of enormous punitive damage awards' 34 -punitive damages do not, in fact, play a major role in the resolution of most large-scale complex litigation. Indeed, it is difficult to identify many large-scale complex cases in which the settlement has included a punitive damage component. In some states, such as Texas, substantive tort law requires that the fact-finder establish a relationship of punitive damages to compensatory damages. 139 The variations in the availability of punitive damages, in turn, effects the ability of plaintiffs to pursue punitive damages on a classwide or aggregate basis, which is often difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish.
Because both plaintiff and defense attorneys are aware of the legal restrictions and difficulties in seeking aggregate punitive damage awards in complex cases, punitive damages have become a bargaining chip that plaintiffs and defendants are likely to flexibly barter in negotiations.
140
Punitive damages are typically "exchanged" by plaintiffs in return for a release from an affirmative defense, such as a statute of limitations, that otherwise would bar a claim. Alternatively, plaintiffs frequently settle aggregate claims for an amount that includes a reduced premium for punitive damages, but for a sum that is less than what the claimants otherwise might have recovered in individual trials. 169, 177 (1998) ("Freedom from punitive damages is the first concession that the tobacco companies have sought in forging a global settlement to the hundreds of thousands of tobacco claims.").
141. See Koenig, supra note 140, at 1130 (demonstrating reduced settlement amounts effected by punitive damage claims).
2001]
Therefore, similar to the right to jury trial, punitive damages in American complex litigation have been rendered a hypothetical and speculative component in the actual resolution of these cases. Just as the attorneys have no expectation of actually trying the litigation, the attorneys also have little expectation that any aggregate settlement will include a punitive damage award. In essence, then, the element of punitive damages has effectively been leeched from American complex litigation.
D. Convergence: Discovery
The process of civil discovery presents another interesting example of incremental convergence. The received wisdom in comparative law is that American federal discovery provides for more liberal discovery than any other legal system in the world. 142 However, the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1 43 to which thirty countries are signatories, 14 4 embodies an example of international comity and accommodation regarding fact-finding and investigation in civil litigation.
14 5 Furthermore, the proposed American Law Institute's
Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure'
46 include provisions that would effectively level the discovery playing field among civil and common law jurisdictions. 147 Moreover, in the discovery arena, the American trend has been this: since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created the regime of liberal discovery in 1938, every reform of the discovery rules has been to require more frank and early disclosure, and has been intended to circumscribe discovery abuse. 148 These discovery reforms have been in response to the realization that the federal discovery rules, rather than enhancing the factfinding process, often impede it at every possible juncture. 149 In other words, for more than sixty years the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has been amending the discovery rules to require more forthright disclosure and to eliminate game-playing as a litigation strategy.
The discovery reforms that the Advisory Committee has effectuated also reflect and embody the more conservative discovery practices of many civil law countries that allow at least some discovery prior to legal proceedings. 150 American discovery rules have been amended to reduce or eliminate unnecessary or excessive discovery. Most prominent among these American discovery reforms have been amendments to restrict the time, place and manner of depositions, the number of depositions and the possibility of repetitive depositions. 151 In addition, the discovery rules have been amended to limit the quantity and length of interrogatories. It is also sobering to reflect that the preponderance of American discovery disputes center on questions relating to various privileges and immunities that protect information from forced disclosure. 153 In this regard, American discovery doctrines are as restrictive, if not more so, than civil law jurisdictions. At any rate, the descriptions of the difference between American and civil law discovery, the availability of materials and access to information may be as overstated as in other comparisons of the American and civil law procedural process.
E. Convergence: Financing Litigation and Attorney Fees
With regard to financing litigation, two features characterize the comparative description of the civil law and American systems. In these standard renditions, civil law systems use the "loser pays" rule, and contingency fee arrangements are not permitted. 154 In contrast, the American legal system requires that each side pay its own fees, and contingency fee contracts are permitted. Although these generalizations apply for simple or traditional litigation, the financing of complex litigation in each system actually is more nuanced and complicated than these generalizations indicate. For example, some civil law and other common law systems, such as Great Britain, have legal aid programs that subsidize plaintiffs' costs for pursuing aggregate relief.' 5 6 Thus, public and private funds may be combined to pool resources in order to pursue aggregate relief. Finland and Sweden have proposed class litigation statutes that would publicly finance aggregate litigation. 15 7 In the United States, the so-called American rule is subject to numerous exceptions, such as fee-shifting statutes, the common fund doctrine and lodestar formulas for calculating attorney fees. 158 In class action litigation, courts oversee fee petitions and approve, modify or reject fee petitions. 159 Also, in class action litigation, defendants usually pay attorney fees, which is the "loser pays" rule without the concomitant obligation that the plaintiff pay the defendant's fees if the plaintiff loses. These public-private financing transactions in complex litigation are far removed from those typically used to describe simple American fee arrangements. What is striking, however, is the degree of convergence with European common law and civil law systems that already have some degree of combined public and private financing of complex litigation.
F. Legislative Solutions for Aggregate Disputes
One of the most striking features of the ways in which European civil law and other common law countries resolve aggregate litigation is through legislation. Thus, some countries have resolved mass disaster for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 48 (1991) (noting that judges review fee petitions in class action suits).
160. See FED. R. Crv. P. 68 ("If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.").
161. claims by enacting legislation to provide compensation for injured claimants. India, for example, passed national legislation 1 6 to resolve claims arising from the industrial accident in which lethal gas was released from a chemical plant operated by Union Carbide India Limited in Bhopal in December 1984. 164 In addition, Japan passed legislation to compensate the child victims whose pregnant mothers had ingested thalidomide in the 1960s. 165 Often these legislative remedial schemes are financed by public funds as well as contributions from the private malfeasors. 166 Many civil law countries also have enacted legislation in the aftermath of mass or aggregate disasters. 167 The purpose of this post-disaster legislation is to provide standards of care, liability and remediation for future conduct. Germany, England and Japan have passed such legislation after their respective experiences with thalidomide litigation. 168 In an emerging trend, some civil law and common law countries have enacted, or are in the process of enacting, statutory schemes to deal with aggregate claims. Finland and Sweden have each proposed extensive and detailed class action statutes. 169 Various Canadian provinces 170 and Australian states 17 1 also have promulgated class action rules and statutes. In South America, Brazil has a consumer class action statutory scheme that includes a class action remediation provision. 172 England also recently en-acted a statute providing for a group action. 1 73 Significantly, in all these instances, these countries considered, but rejected, the American class action rule as the framework for resolving aggregate claims. 1 
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The United States has been slow to embrace legislative solutions to aggregate mass torts or mass disasters. For more than sixty years, Congress has resisted attempts to resolve asbestos litigation through national legislation. 175 Indeed, the rare congressional initiative has been for the opposite purpose, to immunize potential defendants from liability in advance of mass torts. For example, Congress enacted a statute to relieve swine flu manufacturers of liability for any claims arising from use of the vaccine.
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Although the United States Congress has eschewed legislative solutions to aggregate mass tort litigation, this historical resistance may erode in the coming years. Congress currently is considering comprehensive legislation to resolve the American asbestos litigation crisis 177 in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's rejection in 1997 and 1999 of two global class action settlements of such claims. 178 Thus, Congress may finally act to provide a legislative solution to this mass tort crisis, in light of the judicial branch's failure to resolve these claims.
Mass tort litigation, in particular, has demonstrated the apparent limits of the American legal system to resolve aggregate litigation. For many years, courts and commentators have suggested that Congress should legislatively resolve mass tort and other problematic aggregate litigation. Again, the theme of convergence with regard to legislative solutions for mass torts and other aggregate litigation is striking. The United States created the class action rule, but has steadfastly avoided substantive legislative solutions to aggregate litigation. Most civil law countries, in contrast, have steadfastly avoided the class action rule, but have provided for substantive legislative solutions to aggregate claims. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, civil law countries are now embracing class action-like statutory schemes, and the American Congress is giving new scrutiny to substantive legislative solutions to mass torts. By the end of the century, all countries may have some version of a class rule, with parallel substantive legislation for resolving specialized aggregate tort claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Civil lawyers and scholars in Europe, South America, Australia and Canada have studied the American way of resolving complex litigation. As a result, many of these countries have created methods for resolving complex litigation that resemble American aggregate procedures, while at the same time rejecting the problematic procedures and doctrines involved in American class action litigation.
Very few civil law countries have a class action rule, but civil law jurisdictions do resolve aggregate litigation. Many civil law systems have studied the American class action rule and yet none have adopted it wholesale. Some civil law countries have adopted class-action style rules or legislation, with interesting variations on American themes. These jurisdictions have learned from the American experience of resolving complex litigation and have adopted the most attractive features from the American experience. These countries also have taken note of the difficulties and complications entailed in the American legal system's frustrations and failures in resolving complex cases.
In contrast, very little of the civil law experience has permeated or influenced the American understanding of the ways in which other nations resolve complex litigation. In the twenty-first century, then, lessons from abroad may begin to better inform the American legal community about other methods for complex dispute resolution. As American lawyers begin to work on a global stage, increased education about civil law systems may encourage American lawyers andjudges to rethink the ways in which the American legal system attempts to resolve aggregate litigation. Just as civil lawyers have learned a great deal from the American experience, American lawyers may begin to learn a great deal from the civil law experience with resolving aggregate claims. Such exposure, conversation, study and education may, in turn, induce new ways of doing things, both for the American and civil law systems. Complex litigation in the twentyfirst century, then, may result in an interesting convergence of substantive and procedural thinking.
